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FIRM DISQUALIFICATION
MOTIONS-SCREENING AND
IMMEDIATE APPEALS AS OF RIGHT:
ARMSTRONG v. McALPIN
The Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code)' requires
an attorney to avoid all conflicts of interest,' real or apparent.3
Should a conflict arise, therefore, the attorney, as well as his firm,4
is directed to disqualify himself in order to avoid the mere appear-
ance of impropriety.5 This rule has precipitated harsh results espe-
cially where a former government attorney, currently in private
practice, encounters a matter over which he had substantial re-
sponsibility as a public employee. By seemingly necessitating the
' Although not binding upon the courts, the Code of Professional Responsibility has
been recognized by state and federal courts as a statement of the proper rules and guide-
lines for the ethical conduct of the bar. NCK Organization Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128,
129 n.2 (2d Cir. 1976); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 n.12 (2d Cir. 1975); see
Preliminary Statement, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1976).
2 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 5; EC 5-1. Canon 5 provides that
"a lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client."
' See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 9. Canon 9 directs that "a
lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety."
4 DR 5-105(D) was amended in 1974 to state: "If a lawyer is required to decline em-
ployment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner or associ-
ate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or continue such employ-
ment." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-105(D). As amended, this rule
requires disqualification of the firm if the lawyer has been disqualified under any Discipli-
nary Rule. See generally Note, Business As Usual: The Former Government Attorney and
ABA Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D), 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1537, 1539 (1977).
6 DR 9-101(B). The ethical considerations which accompany DR 9-101 appear to pro-
vide conflicting guidelines for an attorney. While it is important for a lawyer to avoid acting
in a manner which may appear unethical, he must never subordinate his duty to his clients
or the public simply because he may be subjected to criticism for his actions. ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 9-2. At the same time, however, an attorney must "strive
to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety." ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 9-6.
' See DR 9-101(B); EC 9-3. DR 9-101(B), which in large part mirrors EC 9-3, provides:
"A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial
responsibility while he was a public employee." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
DR 9-101(B). The government attorney includes all lawyers who worked for government
agencies, members of the judiciary, prosecutors, and elected officials. While the Code pro-
vides different ethical considerations for each type of government attorney, see Comment,
Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65 GEo. L.J. 1025, 1025 n.3
(1977), the distinctions do not affect the issues discussed in this comment.
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disqualification of the former government attorney and his firm,
this rule has threatened to arrest the revolving door between pub-
lic and private employment 7 and to quarantine government em-
ployees who seek to enter private practice.8 Recently, however, in
Armstrong v. McAlpin,9 the Second Circuit held that a mere ap-
pearance of impropriety is insufficient to disqualify a firm when
engaged in a matter which a firm member had substantial respon-
sibility over while a public employee.10 Rather, the applicable stan-
dard was stated to be whether continued representation by the
firm threatens to taint the trial.1' Additionally, the court overruled
its decision in Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp.12 and held that orders denying disqualification motions are
not immediately appealable as of right.'3
As an attorney with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), Theodore Altman had supervised the investigation and
prosecution of a suit against Clovis McAlpin and others, which al-
leged that the defendants had pilfered a number of investment
firms. 14 Following completion of the SEC action, the court-ap-
pointed receiver of the investment companies dismissed the coun-
sel retained to assist in efforts to recover the embezzled money and
hired the firm of Gordon, Hurwitz, Butowsky, Baker, Weitzen and
Shalov (Gordon) as a replacement.15 Shortly thereafter, however,
Many attorneys work for a government agency following graduation from law school
and then associate with a private firm which specializes in government litigation. In fact, it
is common for the same attorney to go through a "revolving door" several times, alterna-
tively working in the government and in private practice. See Moskowitz, Can D.C. Lawyers
Cut The Ties That Bind?, Junis DOCTOR, Sept. 1976, at 34.
7 While halting the revolving-door phenomenon may have the favorable effect of en-
couraging attorneys to make long-term commitments to government service, it is more likely
to deter young, experienced attorneys from seeking government employment because of the
serious difficulties in subsequently obtaining private employment. See Note, Ethical
Problems For the Law Firm of a Former Government Attorney: Firm or Individual Dis-
qualification?, 1977 DuKE L.J. 512, 522-25; Roderick M. Hills, Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission debating with Dean Monroe H. Freedman, reported in The
Washington Post, Oct. 7, 1976, § A, at 17, col. 3.
s See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980)(en banc), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3334 (U.S.
Nov. 4, 1980).
10 625 F.2d at 445.
1 Id. at 433.
12 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974)(en banc).
13 625 F.2d at 440.
" Id. at 435.
' Id. at 436. The court-appointed receiver, Armstrong, had originally retained another
firm which had worked on the case for a year and a half, devoting approximately 2,600 hours
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the receiver discovered that Altman had resigned from the SEC
and had become associated with the Gordon firm.16 While Altman
clearly could not participate in the suit commenced by the re-
ceiver,17 it was agreed ' s that the firm need not be disqualified, as
long as Altman was screened from participation.19 The defendants'
motion to disqualify the Gordon firm due to Altman's prior partici-
pation in the matter was denied by the district court on the ground
that continued representation by Gordon would not be prejudicial
to the defendants.20 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed."
Upon reconsideration, a divided Second Circuit, sitting en
banc, vacated its earlier decision and affirmed the district court.2
Writing for the majority,2  Judge Feinberg first addressed the
to the matter. Id. at 435. When one of its institutional clients became a potential defendant
in the action, however, the initial firm had to be replaced because of a potential conflict of
interest. Id. Due to limited funds and the complexity of the litigation, Armstrong exper-
ienced difficulty in obtaining new counsel. Eventually, the Gordon firm was retained. Id. at
436.
'6 Id. Altman had been employed by the SEC for nine years before resigning. He left
the Commission after the termination of the action against McAlpin which he had super-
vised. Id.
17 As Assistant Director of the Division of Enforcement at the SEC, Altman supervised
about twenty-five attorneys and had substantial responsibility over many cases. Although
not involved in the McAlpin investigation on a day-to-day basis, he was informed of its
progress. Id. Thus, Altman was disqualified under DR 9-101(B). Id. See generally Com-
ment, supra note 6, at 1039-44.
18 After the receiver learned that Altman had joined the Gordon firm, both the Gordon
firm and the firm originally retained, see note 15 supra, researched the effect of Altman's
prior participation in the SEC suit. Although the two firms concluded that Gordon need not
be disqualified if Altman was screened, they consulted the trial judge who then authorized
the retention of the Gordon firm. 625 F.2d at 436. The matter also was brought to the
attention of the SEC, which stated that it did not object as long as Altman was screened
from participation in the matter. Id.
'9 Id. at 436. "Screening" is a procedure through which the disqualified, former govern-
ment attorney is isolated by his firm from participation in any matter related to the disqual-
ification issue. The attorney is not permitted to discuss the matter with his colleagues, is
denied access to all relevant files and documents, and does not receive any remuneration
derived from the case. See ABA Formal Opinion 342, 62 A.B.A.J. 517, 521 (1976).
10 461 F. Supp. 622, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated, 625
F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980)(en banc).
21 606 F.2d at 34. While the Second Circuit panel declined to adopt a general rule for
firm disqualification where a firm member was disqualified under DR 9-101(B), it did point
out two significant factors: whether the matter presented a risk that the former government
attorney would be influenced by the possibility of future employment, and whether the dis-
qualified attorney had a personal involvement in the matter while in government employ.
Id. at 32-33. The court held that since these two factors were present in the instant case,
screening was ineffective to prevent firm disqualification. Id. at 33-34.
" 625 F.2d at 435.
23 Chief Judge Kaufman and Judges Mansfield, Oakes, and Timbers joined in Judge
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question of the appealability of disqualification motions.24 The
court expressed concern over the consequences of its decision in
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,25 which
held orders denying disqualification motions to be immediately ap-
pealable. 28  Noting that the availability of an immediate appeal
spawned an increase in the use of such motions for solely strategic
purposes, such as delay,27 Judge Feinberg reevaluated Silver
Chrysler's finding that denials of disqualification motions fell
within the exception to the final judgment rule2s enunciated by the
Feinberg's opinion. Judges Mulligan and Meskill dissented from the majority's overruling of
Silver Chrysler. Judge Van Graafeiland concurred in the overruling of Silver Chrysler, but
urged dismissal of the appeal on the merits for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Newman dis-
sented from the denial of the disqualification motion.
24 The court had requested the parties to brief the issue of whether the denial of dis-
qualification should be appealable. 625 F.2d at 437.
25 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974)(en banc).
28 Id. at 805.
27 625 F.2d at 437. Both the Second Circuit and various commentators had noted the
use of the disqualification motion as a delaying tactic since the Silver Chrysler decision.
See, e.g., Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1977); W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531
F.2d 671, 677-78 (2d Cir. 1976); Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136, 1139-41 (2d
Cir. 1975); Comment, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions For Disqualification of
Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 450, 450-51 (1978); Note, The Second
Circuit and Attorney Disqualification-Silver Chrysler Steers In A New Direction, 44
FORDHAM L. REV. 130, 137-38, n. 53 (1975).
In his dissent, Judge Mulligan took issue with the majority's belief that there had been
a proliferation of tactical appeals since Silver Chrysler. 625 F.2d at 447 (Mulligan, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Mulligan noted that there had been only eleven
such appeals-six of which resulted in an affirmance of the denial-which hardly could be
"characterize[d] ... as a serious problem of calendar congestion." Id. The majority re-
sponded to Judge Mulligan's assertions by pointing out that Judge Mulligan himself had
stated previously that "[s]ince this court has reversed our prior rule and held that denials of
motions to disqualify counsel are directly appealable to this court ... such motions and
appeals have proliferated." Id. at 437, n.9 (quoting W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671,
678 (2d Cir. 1976)). The majority further stated that the eleven published opinions were not
an accurate reflection of the increased number of appeals, since a significant number of
appeals were either disposed of prior to a hearing or affirmed without opinion. Id. at 437-38.
18 625 F.2d at 437. As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the federal courts of appeals is
limited by the "final order" rule embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Section 1291 pro-
vides: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts. . . ." By rendering interlocutory orders nonappealable as of right, the rule
seeks to avoid piecemeal review and preserve judicial resources. Note, Appealability in the
Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. REV. 351, 351-52 (1961). It has been recognized, however, that
certain orders, if erroneous, may have an especially serious and detrimental effect upon the
litigation. Crick, The Final Judgment As a Basis For Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 553 (1932).
Consequently, a number of statutory and judicially created exceptions permit the immediate
appeal of certain interlocutory orders, see, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541 (1949); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292, 1651(a) (1976). See notes 29 & 33-34 and accompa-
nying text infra.
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Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.2e
Under Cohen, an order is appealable if it is collateral to the merits,
too important to be denied immediate review, and if the denial of
an appeal would pose a threat of irreparable harm to the movant.'s
The Armstrong court held that although the denial of a disqualifi-
cation motion is indeed collateral, the latter two Cohen require-
ments were not satisfied, and thus Silver Chrysler must be
overruled. 31
Judge Feinberg reasoned that while an erroneous denial of a
disqualification motion may compel a party to bear the cost and
inconvenience of a tainted trial,32 the possibility of irreparable
harm is mitigated by the party's ability to obtain either a new trial
or an immediate appeal through certification 3 or mandamus.34 Ad-
ditionally, the Armstrong court construed the "too important to be
denied review" requirement of Cohen to mean that an order must
It should be noted that while a final order has been defined as one which terminates the
action in such a manner that the court need only execute the judgment, Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945); see City of Louisa v. Levi, 140 F.2d 512, 514 (6th Cir. 1944),
there is no simple rule for determining when an order is final. For examples of appealable
and nonappealable orders see note 56 infra. See generally 9 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
110.08[1] (2d ed. 1980).
29 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949). In Cohen, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
the appealability of an order denying a defendant's motion to require the plaintiff to post
security for the defendants' costs in a stockholders' derivative action. Id. at 543. In holding
the order appealable, the Court noted that the denial did not have the characteristics of
orders traditionally held nonappealable under section 1291. Here the denial order was not
tentative or incomplete and would not be merged into the final judgment. Moreover, review
after final judgment would be an empty rite. Id. at 546.
30 337 U.S. at 545-47. See also Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 154
(1964).
s 625 F.2d at 440.
32 Id. at 438. The court noted that the harm resulting from an erroneous disqualifica-
tion is not significantly different from the harm that may result when other erroneous inter-
locutory orders are held to be nonappealable. Id. See, e.g., Weight Watchers of Philadelphia,
Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972); American Express
Warehousing, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 277, 281-82 (2d Cir. 1967); Rosen v.
Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1966).
33 Certification is obtained pursuant to the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appeala-
ble under this section shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ulti-
mate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The
Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken
from such order ....
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
'" 625 F.2d at 438; see note 70 infra.
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raise a legal issue. 35 Since most disqualification orders rest upon
factual questions, this component was not satisfied.36 Accordingly,
the court overruled Silver Chrysler and held that orders denying
disqualification motions were no longer appealable as of right.3 7
Turning to the merits,38 the court acknowledged the district
court's finding that Altman was disqualified since he had substan-
tial responsibility over the matter while a government employee.39
The court then addressed whether the firm should be disqualified
because one of its members had been disqualified.40 Noting that
both the district court and the Second Circuit panel had found no
"taint of trial" because of the Gordon firm's continued representa-
tion of the receiver, the court refused to require disqualificatioA on
the ground that there was an appearance of impropriety.41 Judge
Feinberg asserted that "the possible 'appearance of impropriety is
11 625 F.2d at 439; see note 96 infra. The public importance requirement, apparent in
the Cohen Court's statement that not "every order fixing security is subject to appeal," 337
U.S. at 547, has not, however, been applied consistently by the Court in subsequent cases.
Indeed, certain orders have been held appealable under Cohen notwithstanding that they
involved primarily factual rather than legal issues. See, e.g., Abney v. United States, 431
U.S. 651 (1977) (order rejecting defense of double jeopardy); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1
(1951) (order denying request for bail reduction); Roberts v. United States District Court,
339 U.S. 844 (1950) (order denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis). But see Coopers
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1978). The Armstrong court distinguished these
rulings by stating that although these cases involved primarily factual issues, they also
presented a threat of irreparable harm through devastation of important constitutional
rights. 625 F.2d at 339. It has been suggested that although the Supreme Court has not
emphasized the public importance aspect, every case heard by that Court must have had a
high degree of importance, otherwise certiorari would not have been granted. Comment,
supra note 27, at 456 n.28.
: 625 F.2d at 339.
7 Id. In overruling Silver Chrysler, the Armstrong court rejected the rule of limited
appealability, advocated by Judge Mulligan in his dissent, id. at 440 n.13. Judge Mulligan
would authorize immediate appeals of disqualification denials which "involv[e] the integrity
of the trial." Id. at 449 (Mulligan, J., dissenting in part). The majority contended that such
a procedure would require as much appellate attention as a full hearing on the merits and
would, therefore, be as much a delaying tool as an appeal as of right. Id. at 440 n.13. The
majority also rejected Judge Mulligan's assertion that the presence of a threat of taint could
be determined by a superficial examination of the disciplinary rule involved. Id.
" Judge Feinberg stated that while ordinarily a finding that the court lacks jurisdiction
will preclude it from ruling on the merits, he explained that such a ruling was necessary in
order to provide guidance to lower courts in the proper standard for firm disqualification.
Furthermore, since the en banc court had already entertained all the facts of the case, it
would be inefficient and wasteful to require another court to duplicate this effort. 625 F.2d
at 442.
" 625 F.2d at 442; see note 5 supra.
40 625 F.2d at 442-43; see note 6 supra.
4, 625 F.2d at 445.
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simply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order
. . . particularly. . . where . . . the appearance of impropriety is
not very clear.' '-42 Focusing instead on the integrity of the trial
process,43 the court noted that the Gordon firm was not attempting
to represent conflicting interests." Moreover, no advantage could
be gained through the use of privileged information because the
receiver had obtained the SEC's files and Altman had been effec-
tively screened from participation in the case.45 Having found no
taint of trial, the court denied the disqualification motion stating
that any ethical considerations were best left to the disciplinary
committees of the bar.48
Judge Mulligan, dissenting from the court's overruling of Sil-
ver Chrysler, argued that the denial of a disqualification motion
should remain appealable since the Cohen requirements were satis-
fied.47 The "irreparable harm" requirement was met because the
use of privileged information would taint not only the original trial
but any retrial granted upon appeal.4 Additionally, certification
and mandamus were insufficient to protect against this harm.4" As
to the public importance requirement, Judge Mulligan argued that
recent Supreme Court authority illustrated that the issue to be de-
cided need not be a legal one.50
42 Id. (quoting Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979)). Judge
Feinberg expressed concern that a disqualification order at such a late stage in the litigation
would effectively impede the receiver's chances of recovering on his cause of action. Id.
41 625 F.2d at 444. The court's approach represented an adoption of the rationale ex-
pressed in Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979).
" 625 F.2d at 445.
41 Id. Although the Armstrong court declined to expressly rule on the ethical propriety
of screening techniques, id. at 444, its affirmance of the district court implies some approval
of these techniques. In the procedures employed in this case, Altman was denied access to
records, did not share in any fees, and his colleagues were ordered not to discuss the case in
his presence. 461 F. Supp. at 624-25.
4' 625 F.2d at 446. See also Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir.
1979). The Nyquist court contended that a court need not deal with all ethical violations in
the case in which they arise since the state and federal bars have ample disciplinary powers.
Id.; see Lefrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1975); FED. R. APP. P.
46(c); 2D CIR. R. § 46(h); cf. United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843 (1980) (courts do not have unlimited discretion to dis-
qualify because of violations of ethical standards).
" 625 F.2d at 451 (Mulligan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
41 Id. at 449 (Mulligan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
41 Id. at 450 (Mulligan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
10 Id. at 451 (Mulligan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Mulligan ar-
gued that the majority's reasoning could not consistently hold grants of disqualification or-
ders to be appealable. In particular, he could not comprehend how disqualification grants
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Judge Newman, dissenting in part, charged the majority with
avoiding the key issue of whether, under Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-
105(D), a law firm may continue representation even though one of
its members has been disqualified pursuant to DR 9-101(B). 1 He
argued that the Gordon firm should have been disqualified on the
basis of an appearance of impropriety to ensure that the underly-
ing purposes of DR 9-101(B) were fulfilled.52 Alternatively, Judge
Newman contended that if taint of trial was the proper standard,
such a taint did exist in this case despite the use of screening.5 3
Judge Newman concluded, therefore, that the motion to disqualify
should have been granted regardless of whether the standard ap-
plied was taint of trial or appearance of impropriety.
5 4
Appealability of Disqualification Motions
It is submitted that the Armstrong decision precluding imme-
diate appeals as of right for orders denying disqualification mo-
tions comports with the underlying policy considerations of both
the final judgment rule and the Cohen "collateral order" excep-
tion.5" It is suggested, however, that although the Armstrong court
could be appealable when they pose the same problem as disqualification denials in that
they do not present an important legal issue. Id. at 450 (Mulligan J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
81 625 F.2d at 452 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
82 Id. (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Is Id. at 453 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Newman main-
tained that screening would never eliminate the risk that the former government attorney
would reveal information unavailable to the other side. Id. (Newman, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
Id. (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
88 See notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra. The Second Circuit's position on the
appealability of disqualification motions has followed an inconsistent path. Prior to 1959,
the Second Circuit had heard appeals from both orders granting and denying disqualifica-
tion, albeit without discussion of Cohen or the final-judgment rule. See, e.g., Fisher Studio
Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 232 F.2d 199 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 836 (1956); Laskey Bros.,
Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932
(1956); Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Mgmt. Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d
Cir. 1954). The court expressly held that disqualification denials were appealable under the
Cohen exception in Harmar Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 239 F.2d
555 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1957), but reversed itself in Fleischer v. Phil-
lips, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959). See Note, Appealability of
Denials of Motions to Disqualify Counsel, 1975 WAsH. U.L.Q. 212, 221-22. The Second Cir-
cuit once again reversed itself in Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,
469 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974)(en bane), where the court held that "Cohen requires a return to
the wisdom of Harmar. . . ." Id. at 805. For a discussion of the Silver Chrysler rationale,
see Note, Appealability of Denials of Motions to Disqualify Counsel, 1975 WAsH. U.L.Q.
212, 222-23.
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obtained the correct result, it misconstrued the requirements of
Cohen. By interpreting the "public importance" test of Cohen as
requiring that the appeal seek to review a question of law, and not
one of fact, the Armstrong court has failed to take into account the
"practical rather than technical construction" language in Cohen."
The Armstrong holding that orders denying disqualification motions are nonappealable
aligns the Second Circuit with the District of Columbia, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals. See In re Multi-Piece Rim Products Liability Litigation, 612 F.2d 377
(8th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 446 U.S. 934
(1980); Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1979); Community
Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Chugach Elec. Ass'n v.
United States Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967).
Though the First Circuit has not ruled on this issue, it has noted its agreement with the
circuits holding an immediate appeal to be appropriate. See In re Benjamin, 582 F.2d 121
(1st Cir. 1978). The circuits which have held orders denying disqualification motions to be
nonappealable have based their decision on the prevalent use of such motions as a dilatory
and strategic tool and the failure of such motions to comply with Cohen's "irreparable
harm" requirement. See, e.g., Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290 (6th
Cir. 1979); Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Currently, the circuits which oppose Armstrong and permit immediate appeal of dis-
qualification denials are the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth. E.g., Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978);
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 563 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1977);
Akerly v. Red Barn System, Inc., 551 F.2d 539 (3d Cir. 1977); Schloetter v. Railoc of Indi-
ana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 1976); State of New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1976). Most of the circuit court decisions which hold
disqualification denials to be immediately appealable categorically state such orders fall
within the Cohen exception to the final judgment rule without discussing their reasoning.
See, e.g., Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); State of New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1976). The Seventh Circuit, however, has explained that disqualifica-
tion denials meet the Cohen requisites because an erroneous order would deprive a movant
of its chosen counsel thus causing it harm which could not be remedied by appeal from final
judgment. Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 1976). This rea-
soning is faulty, however, because it fails to distinguish between grants and denials of dis-
qualification motions. A denial of a motion for disqualification would not separate a party
from his chosen counsel. Accordingly, this logic would not support the theory that the mo-
vant is irreparably harmed by refusing immediate review of a disqualification denial. It is
apparent that although five circuits continue to hold denials of motions for disqualification
to be appealable, none present persuasive reasons or arguments for doing so. Thus, it is
submitted that the Armstrong court has correctly limited the application of the Cohen ex-
ception to the final-judgment rule. See 9 J. MooRE, supra note 28, T 110.13[10], at 190.
" See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). Relying on the
"practical not technical" language of Cohen, the Supreme Court has held that an order
refusing to reduce bail, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), and an order refusing leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, Roberts v. United States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950), are
appealable under Cohen. Other orders that have been held appealable under Cohen include
an order quashing writs of attachment and garnishment, American Oil Co. v. McMullin, 433
F.2d 1091 (10th Cir. 1970), an order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on the
ground of double jeopardy, Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), and an order ap-
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Moreover, the court's reasoning is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's determination that orders denying a motion to dismiss an
indictment on double jeopardy grounds are appealable as of right
notwithstanding that such orders often involve questions of fact.57
In addition, the suggestion that Cohen requires that the appeal in-
volve a question of law would prevent immediate review as of right
from orders granting disqualification since they too involve ques-
tions of fact.58
The Armstrong court's interpretation of the public importance
requirement, however, does not mitigate the accuracy of its deci-
sion since denials of disqualification motions do not appear to
comply with the second requisite of Cohen-the threat of irrepara-
ble harm to the movant.59 Since the possibility of disclosure of con-
proving a settlement in a class action, In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Liti-
gation, 594 F.2d 1106 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1980). Orders that have
been held nonappealable under the Cohen rule include an order denying a motion to dismiss
an indictment for an alleged violation of the defendant's right to a speedy trial, United
States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978), an order granting a motion to stay court proceed-
ings and an order denying a motion to stay arbitration, New England Power Co. v. Asiatic
Petroleum Corp., 456 F.2d 183, 188 (1st Cir. 1972), and an order denying a motion for sum-
mary judgment, Hodgson v. Board of Educ., 468 F.2d 1325 (3d Cir. 1972).
57 See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). The Abney Court stated that al-
though orders denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds are
not final in the sense that they terminate the proceedings, such orders do fall within the
Cohen collateral order exception. Id. at 659. The Court reasoned that such orders are final
in the sense that there are "no further steps that can be taken in the District Court to avoid
the trial" and collateral in the sense that they do not deal with the principal issue, namely
the defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. Moreover, the Court found that the irreparable harm
requirement was met in that the double jeopardy clause guarantee against being put to trial
twice for the same crime would be lost if a defendant were required to postpone appeal until
after conviction. Id. at 660-61. The Court, however, failed to discuss whether the "public
importance" requirement was met. Assuming, arguendo, that a question of law was involved
in Abney, a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds will often involve a
question of fact. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court's failure to address this portion of the
Cohen test has given rise to some doubt as to whether public importance is necessary for an
order to fall within the collateral order exception. See, e.g., Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651 (1977); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), Swift & Co. Packers v. Com-
pania Columbiana del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684 (1950). Many circuits, most notably the
Second Circuit, have continued, however, to require public importance. See, e.g., Steering
Comm. v. Mead Corp., 611 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1980); Van-S-Aviation Corp. v. Piper Air-
craft Corp., 551 F.2d 213, 217 (8th Cir. 1977); Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 410 (2d Cir.
1976); Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 519 F.2d 595, 597-98 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033
(1975); General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 647 (2d Cir. 1974); Donlon
Indus. v. Forte, 402 F.2d 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1968); Bancroft Navigation Co. v. Chadade S.S.
Co., 349 F.2d 527, 529-30 (2d Cir. 1965).
58 See note 56 supra.
11 See note 32 and accompanying text supra; Comment, supra note 27, at 456-57. It has
been noted that the possible harm of an erroneous disqualification denial is similar to the
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fidential information exists from the inception of the litigation, an
immediate appeal would not be more effective in ameliorating the
potential injury to the movant than an appeal from final judg-
ment.6 0 If the unsuccessful advocate of disqualification were per-
mitted an immediate appeal and won, he still has no assurance
that confidential information was not imparted in the interim."'
By limiting the reason for the non-appealability of orders de-
nying disqualification to the failure of such orders to threaten ir-
reparable harm, it is not inconsistent to hold that grants of dis-
qualification are immediately appealable.6 2 Whereas no threat of
irreparable harm exists when a disqualification order is denied,
such is not the case when an order is granted. When a disqualifica-
tion motion is granted, a party is not only deprived of the counsel
of his choice, but countless hours must be spent in seeking out new
counsel and familiarizing him with the facts of the case.63 In addi-
tion, because of pressure to keep the lawsuit moving, the newly
appointed counsel may not have sufficient time to master the case
harm that may be caused by an erroneous discovery order. See Comment, supra note 27, at
457. The effect of an erroneous discovery order may be to reveal confidential information or
to suppress information necessary to maintain a fair trial. Id. at 457. Similarly, an erroneous
disqualification denial also may result in the revelation of confidential information in the
possession of counsel. Nonetheless, discovery orders have been held not to fall within the
Cohen rule and, therefore, are nonappealable. See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S.
117 (1906); Baker v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir. 1974); 9 J. MooRE,
supra note 28, 1 110.13[2], at 153-59.
60 See Comment, supra note 27, at 457.
61 If confidential information were imparted between the time the disqualification mo-
tion was made and the granting of such motion on immediate appeal, there is a possibility
that the prejudice could not be corrected thereafter. Upon an appeal from final judgment,
however, a court could scrutinize whether confidential information was imparted and, if so,
the court could grant a new trial if prejudice were found. Id. Thus, judicial resources would
be preserved through the use of "hindsight" to determine whether disqualification is neces-
sary. It may be argued, however, that a new trial will not always cure the resultant harm
because any prejudicial information in the record is public and cannot be erased.
62 The circuits which have distinguished between the appealability of orders granting
disqualification and those denying disqualification generally have limited their rationale to
the fact that orders denying disqualification do not meet the irreparable harm requirement
of Cohen. See, e.g., In re Multi-Piece Rim Products Liability Litigation, 612 F.2d 377 (8th
Cir.), cert. granted sub nom., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 446 U.S. 934 (1980);
Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1979); Community Broad-
casting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
63 When disqualification is granted, the lawsuit is interrupted because the party de-
prived of his counsel must obtain new counsel who then must become familiar with the case.
Thus, immediate appeal does not substantially prolong the litigation. In contrast, there is no
interruption when disqualification is denied unless an immediate appeal is allowed. See
Fleisher v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515, 517 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959).
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so that he can ably represent his client. A holding that orders
granting disqualification may be appealed only after final judg-
ment, therefore, would have the effect of eliminating any possible
relief.6 4 Thus, a threat of irreparable harm is present.65
In holding that denials of disqualification motions are not ap-
pealable under Cohen, the Armstrong court did not totally pre-
clude an immediate appeal. Rather, the court suggested that such
orders may be appealed through certification or writ of manda-
mus.66 It is submitted that the use of these two modes of review
will help to eliminate the abuse that has attended the appealability
of disqualification motions pursuant to the Cohen doctrine.6 7 Be-
cause the granting of an appeal by mandamus or certification is
discretionary, s a court need only choose to hear the more worthy
cases, thus eliminating frivolous appeals." Moreover, in order to
obtain an immediate appeal through mandamus or certification,
standards more stringent than the Cohen requirements must be
satisfied.70 Thus, the use of these two modes of review would en-
" If a party wins the case after his attorney was disqualified, the disqualification be-
comes moot. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 402 (S.D. Tex. 1969). If, after
disqualification, the party loses the case, then the error most likely would be deemed non-
prejudicial since to prove prejudice the party must show that the outcome of the case was
affected by the relative unpreparedness and incompetence of the substituted counsel. Com-
ment, supra note 27, at 458.
6 Cf. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977)(appeal from final judgment would
not vindicate defendant's Double Jeopardy Clause rights); United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S.
530, 533 (1971)(only where "denial of immediate review would render impossible any review
whatsoever" will an exception to final judgment rule be allowed).
60 Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 438.
e See 9 J. MooR, supra note 28, 1 110.10, at 136.
6' See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976); Fed. R. App. P. 21(a),(b).
' See 9 J. MOORE, supra note 28, T 110.10, at 136. See generally Note, Supervisory and
Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86 HAav. L. REv. 595 (1973).
10 One of the prerequisites to obtaining certification is that the order must involve a
"controlling question of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). See note 33 supra. This prerequi-
site effectively will eliminate most disqualification denials from appeal through certification
since, as stated in Armstrong, disqualification denials frequently present questions of fact,
rather than law. Moreover, most courts have held that an abuse of the trial court's discre-
tion does not constitute a controlling question of law. Garner v. Wolflnbarger, 433 F.2d 117,
119 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Salter, 421 F.2d 1393, 1394 (1st Cir. 1970); Phelps v.
Burnham, 327 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1964).
A writ of mandamus is available pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)
(1976). Due to the extraordinary nature of the remedy, it may only be used to correct a clear
abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial power. The Armstrong court did not discuss
under what circumstances mandamus could serve as a remedy to permit appeals of disquali-
fication and its effectiveness remains to be seen. See note 75 infra; Will v. United States,
389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967); Hospes v. Burmite Division of Whittaker Corp., 420 F. Supp. 806
(S.D. Miss. 1976); C. WmGHT, TE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL CouRTs § 102, at
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able the courts to determine, on a case by case basis, the propriety
of an immediate appeal.
While noting the availability of these alternative remedies, the
Armstrong court failed to discuss how they may be utilized. Al-
though both modes of review are appropriate only when an appeal
is not otherwise available,7 1 certification is available only to review
questions of law,7 12 whereas mandamus is the correct vehicle for re-
view where an abuse of discretion is alleged. Since a denial of
disqualification will be reversed most often on the ground of abuse
of discretion, '7 4 mandamus appears to be more appropriate for re-
view of such orders. 5
As this comment went to print, the Supreme Court decided
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord.7 6 In Firestone, the Court
held that orders denying disqualification do not fall within the Co-
516 (3d ed. 1976).
71 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 584 (1943);
Cartier v. Secretary of State, 506 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Hankish, 462
F.2d 316, 318-19 (4th Cir. 1972).
72 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
'3 See Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Bagley, 601 F.2d 949, 953 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 907 (1979); SEC v. Krentzman, 397 F.2d 55, 59 (5th Cir. 1968); Rosen v. Sugarman,
357 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1966); Hospes v. Burmite Division of Whittaker Corp., 420 F. Supp.
806 (S.D. Miss. 1976); 9 J. MooRE, supra note 28, at 1 110.22[5].
" There are instances, however, where a denial of disqualification will involve a "con-
trolling question of law" so that certification would be the proper avenue of xeview. For
example, a controlling question of law would be present if there was a question as to
whether the district court considered the proper factors in reaching its conclusion. See A.
Olnick & Sons v. Dempster Brothers Inc., 365 F.2d 436, 442 (2d Cir. 1966). An abuse of
discretion would exist, however, if the district court considered the correct factors but
reached the wrong result. Id. at 442-43. Thus, certification would be appropriate only when
the applicable standard for disqualification is uncertain. See Community Broadcasting of
Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022, 1028 n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
"' Trone v. Smith, 553 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1977), Thus far, at least two circuits have
sanctioned the use of mandamus to review orders denying disqualification. See Community
Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Chugach Elec.
Ass'n v. United States District Court, 370 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
820 (1967); Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1964). In Cord v. Smith, the court
explained that mandamus was appropriate to review a nonappealable disqualification denial
where the continued involvement of an attorney who properly should have been disqualified
would cause irreversible harm. Id. The District of Columbia Circuit has likewise limited the
availability of mandamus in disqualification denials to the "exceptional case" where ir-
remedial injury is threatened. Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d
1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In a situation closely analogous to a denial of disqualifica-
tion-the refusal of a judge to disqualify himself-several courts have treated mandamus as
the appropriate remedy. See, e.g., SCA Servs., Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 117-18 (7th Cir.
1977); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 797 (2d Cir. 1966).
76 49 U.S.L.W. 4089 (Jan. 13, 1981).
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hen collateral order exception and thus are not immediately ap-
pealable under section 1291 of title 28. The Firestone Court reiter-
ated that collateral orders are orders that "conclusively determine
the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely sepa-
rate from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively unreview-
able on appeal from final judgment." " The Court stated that an
order denying disqualification conclusively determines the dis-
puted question and assumed, but did not decide, that the public
importance requirement was met. The Court then focused on the
third requirement and held that such an order is not "effectively
unreviewable on appeal from final judgment. '78 It was reasoned
that erroneous denials of disqualification are not orders which
cause irrepairable harm since there are several ways the movant
may mitigate the potential harm or obtain review.79 The party may
request a protective order diminishing counsel's ability to disclose
confidential information or may seek review through certification
or mandamus.80 Additionally, after final judgment the court of ap-
peals may order a new trial if it determines that the denial of dis-
qualification constituted prejudicial error.81 Thus, the Supreme
Court has approved the Armstrong court's holding that orders de-
nying disqualification are not immediately appealable. It should be
noted that the Armstrong court held that such orders failed to ful-
fill the second and third requirements of the collateral order excep-
tion. The Supreme Court, however, based its decision on the fail-
ure to satisfy the third requirement without deciding whether the
second requirement was met. The Court's rationale thus leaves
open the question of whether an immediate appeal may lie from an
order granting attorney disqualification.
Disqualification Standard82
The new "taint of trial" standard espoused by the Second Cir-
77 Id. at 4091 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
8 Id. at 4091.
79 Id. at 4091-92.
" Id. at 4092 n.13.
81 Id. at 4091.
12 In light of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 49 U.S.L.W. 4089 (Jan. 13, 1981),
the Supreme Court has vacated the judgment in Armstrong and remanded it to the Second
Circuit with instructions to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 49 U.S.L.W. 3514
(Jan. 19, 1981). As a result, the Armstrong court's decision on the merits no longer is techni-
cally binding as stare decisis. There is no reason to believe, however, that the Second Circuit
will deviate from the policy considerations set forth in Armstrong when confronted with a
19811
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cuit in Armstrong shifts the attention of the court from considera-
tion of ethical violations to the integrity and quality of the trial.8 3
The decision thus follows the trend to mitigate the court's role as
arbiter of ethical disputes that arise during litigation.," The Arm-
strong court's rejection of a literal application of DR 5-105(D),
however, should not be taken as an indication of a willingness to
modify or reject the express provisions of the Code.85 Rather, when
read in light of its underlying policy considerations-specifically,
keeping open the revolving door between public and private prac-
tice and enabling the government to attract bright, able attor-
neys 8'-the decision appears to implement the position of the
American Bar Association as articulated in Formal Opinion 342.87
similar issue on an appeal from final judgment. Indeed, the court had done so prior to the
Firestone decision, see Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980) (also vacated in
light of Firestone, 49 U.S.L.W. 3597 (Feb. 24, 1981)), and presumably will continue to do so
in future decisions. Thus, the Armstrong opinion should be viewed as an authoritative, al-
beit not binding, statement of the Second Circuit's policy in this area of professional
responsibility.
M' See United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1979); Board of Educ. v. Ny-
quist, 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979); Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th
Cir. 1976).
" See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Lefrak v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1976); Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuti-
cals, 510 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1975).
81 Although adopting a rule which tends to minimize the attention paid by courts to
ethical disputes, the Armstrong court hastened to add that it did not intend to depreciate
the significance of the Bar Association efforts to enforce ethical standards. 625 F.2d at 445-
46. Accordingly, the Code will continue to act as a guide for courts in applying the taint of
trial standard. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
s See note 87 and accompanying text infra.
8 A literal reading of DR 5-105(D) would require disqualification of a firm whenever a
member of that firm has been disqualified under DR 9-101(B). See note 4 and accompany-
ing text supra; Note, Business As Usual: The Former Government Attorney and ABA Dis-
ciplinary Rule 5-105(D), 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1537, 1539 (1977). Aware of the consequences of
such an application, the ABA issued Opinion 342 in an attempt to soften the harsh results
arising from a literal reading of DR 5-105(D). ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINION
No. 342 (1975), reprinted in 62 A.B.A.J. 517 (1976)[hereinafter cited as ABA OPINION 342].
The opinion stated that the presence of an appearance of impropriety is only one of the
policy considerations underlying DR 9-101(B), id. at 518, and that a less stringent applica-
tion of DR 5-105(D) is consistent with the overall purposes of DR 9-101(B), id. at 521. The
opinion concluded that a government agency should be able to waive DR 5-105(B) disquali-
fication when it is convinced that the screening techniques will effectively isolate the attor-
ney and there is "no appearance of significant impropriety affecting the interests of the
government ... ." Id. The policy considerations weighed in limiting disqualification to sit-
uations where the attorney cannot be screened effectively included the possible restraint on
the government's continued ability to attract qualified attorneys, preventing the use of the
rule as a strategic tool to deprive an opponent of qualified counsel, and the possible unnec-
essary interference with a party's right to retain counsel of his choice. Id. at 518.
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These policy considerations become obvious when it is recog-
nized that firm disqualification under DR 5-105(D) is predicated
upon the assumption that a lawyer's knowledge of a court's affairs
is shared by other lawyers within his firm.88 Although this pre-
sumption was originally held to be one of law,89 more recent cases
have held, that it is only an inference. 90 By rejecting the mere ap-
pearance of impropriety as the standard for firm disqualification,
however, the Armstrong court has gone one step further and elimi-
nated the presumption when a former government attorney is
properly screened by his firm from participating in matters over
which he had substantial responsibility as a public employee.91 The
In addition to the ABA, other groups have issued opinions expressing their views as to
the proper interpretation of DR 5-105(D). See NEW YORK BAR ASSOCIATION COMM. ON PRO-
FESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, OPINION No. 889, 31 THE RECORD 552 (1976); Tentative
Draft Opinion for Comment, Inquiry 19, DISTRmT LAWYER, Fall 1976; 41 Fed. Reg. 41,106
(1976)(Chief Counsel's Advisory Committee on Rules of Professional Conduct-Final Re-
port to the Hon. M. Whitaker, Chief Counsel).
Adopting a stance similar to that of the ABA, the opinion of the Association of the Bar
of New York City noted the law's traditional abhorrence of unjustified, unnecessary re-
straints on individual employment, the adverse effect blanket disqualifications would have
on the government's ability to hire and retain competent attorneys, and the responsibility of
the bar to ensure that qualified lawyers are available to the public. NEW YORK BAR ASSOC.
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, OPINION No. 889, 31 THE RECORD 552, 566
(1976). The opinion also voiced its agreement with the ABA on screening, noting that where
a disqualified attorney can be effectively screened, the lawyer's firm or associates should not
be disqualified. Id.
88 See Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA.
L. REv. 677, 682 (1980).
81 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Dean Food Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 386 (8th Cir. 1979), over-
ruled in part on other grounds, In re Multi-Piece Rim Prods. Liability Litigation, 612 F.2d
377 (1980)(en banc), cert. granted, sub nom., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 446
U.S. 934 (1980); Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710-11 (7th Cir. 1976); Laskey Bros.
v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1955).
90 See, e.g., Novo Terapeutisk Lab. A/S v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 607 F.2d 186,
197 (7th Cir. 1979) (en banc); Akerly v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 543-44 (3d Cir.
1977); Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
861 (1976); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d
Cir. 1975), overruled on other grounds, Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir.
1980)(en banc); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 209 (N.D.
Ohio 1976), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
91 The rapid growth and expansion of today's law firms renders the presumption of
imputed knowledge impractical as well as prohibitive. As a law firm grows larger, the poten-
tial number of conflicts of interest that may arise increases greatly. Further, most law firms
no longer require its members to serve long terms of service, thereby increasing the number
of potential conflicts. See Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Eth-
ics and Intra-Firm Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1068-69 (1964); 82 DICK. L. Rv.
625, 628 (1978). Notably, in Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518
F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975)(en banc), overruled on other grounds, Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625
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effect of the Armstrong decision, therefore, is to place the onus
squarely on the proponent of disqualification to show "taint of
trial," while alleviating the opposing party's burden of rebutting
the presumption of shared knowledge.92
The burden on the moving party was increased further by the
Armstrong court's implicit approval of screening as a means by
which the prohibitions of DR 5-105(D) may be avoided.93 Thus,
the movant must show the screening is ineffective to prevent taint
of trial. 4 This burden, however, is not as overwhelming as it may
seem because of the court's refusal to sanction screening in all situ-
ations. The Armstrong court indicated that screening will be re-
jected where the former government attorney's firm attempts con-
currently to represent adverse interests; where the former
government attorney has knowledge of privileged information con-
cerning his opponent; and where the former government attorney
may have knowledge, gained while with the government, which is
unavailable to an opponent in a subsequent suit.95
F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980)(en banc), the court noted that it would be "absurd" to assume that
all attorneys entering large firms immediately attain knowledge of all confidential matters
within the firm. Id. at 753-54.
"2 See generally 9 J. WIGoMoRE, EViDENCE § 2489 (3d ed. 1940).
93 See note 45 and accompanying text supra. The Armstrong court agreed with the
contentions of various amici that a rejection of screening might impede the government's
ability to employ well-qualified attorneys by deterring attorneys from entering government
service for fear of severe restriction on their later ability to return or switch to private prac-
tice. 625 F.2d at 443. Moreover, attorneys currently in government service might refuse to
accept greater authority in anticipation of future career limitations. Id.
94 See Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980); Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 445
(2d Cir. 1980)(en banc). It is suggested that standard screening procedures should be set up
by firms which specialize in government litigation. In particular, prior to hiring, each attor-
ney should be questioned carefully to ascertain what matters the attorney had substantial
responsibility over while in government employ. The firm also should circulate a memoran-
dum to all members setting forth the screening procedures which should include exclusion
of the disqualified attorney from all discussions of the case and denial of access to any
relevant files and documents. Additionally, the attorney should be prohibited from receiving
any remuneration from the case and physically separated from attorneys working on cases
from which the individual attorney is disqualified. See Comment, The Chinese Wall De-
fense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 677, 678 (1980).
5 Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 444. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d
1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979). In Nyquist, the board of education brought a declaratory judg-
ment action to determine whether the school district must maintain separate seniority lists
for male and female physical education instructors for use in layoffs. The plaintiff sought a
judgment declaring that the merger of the lists would be lawful. The named defendants
included several male and female teachers. 590 F.2d at 1243. The male teachers alleged that
the maintenance of separate seniority lists' was unlawful. The female teachers, however,
claimed that separate seniority lists were necessary to remedy the past discrimination cre-
ated by their seniority status and that if the merged list was used, it would result in the
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Applying the standards promulgated by the Armstrong court,
there are several other situations in which screening most likely
would be deemed ineffective." Assume, for example, that in a suit
against the Small Business Administration (SBA) alleging favorit-
ism among bidders, the law firm retained by the plaintiffs hires a
former SBA attorney who had defended the SBA in a number of
similar suits.9 7 Under the Armstrong guidelines, screening would
be ineffective for several reasons. Unlike Altman, the SBA attorney
is "potentially in a position to use privileged information obtained
through prior representation of the other side."98 Moreover, there
is a substantial appearance of impropriety, despite screening,
which would justify disqualification of the firm.99
layoff of many more female than male teachers. The male teachers were represented by an
attorney who was general counsel of a teachers organization which indirectly received dues
paid by both the male and female teachers. Id. at 1243-44. The dues were used in part to
fund the legal aid program through which the male defendants obtained their counsel. The
female teachers alleged that they were being forced to help fund the costs of the male defen-
dants' legal representation and thus moved to disqualify the attorney because of the appar-
ent conflict of interest. The court held that disqualification was not appropriate, reasoning
that there was no taint of trial present and that a mere appearance of impropriety was
insufficient to warrant disqualification except in an extraordinary case. Id. at 1247.
96 In a decision subsequent to Armstrong, the Second Circuit demonstrated that it
would not permit screening procedures in all situations. In Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d
1052 (2d Cir. 1980), one of the associates with the defendant's law firm had previously
worked for the legal aid service representing Cheng. Disqualifying defendant's counsel pur-
suant to DR 5-105(D), the court held screening ineffective because there was a danger that
confidential information would be revealed. Id. at 1058. The court distinguished the facts
from Armstrong on several grounds. In Cheng, the size of the law firm was fairly small in
contrast to the Gordon firm in Armstrong. Id. at 1058 n.7. The disqualified associate in
Cheng was not a former government attorney so that the many policy considerations under-
lying Armstrong were absent. Id. In Cheng, a threat of taint of trial existed whereas none
existed in Armstrong. Id. Additionally, the former employer in Cheng had objected to the
defendant firm's continued representation whereas the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, Altman's former employer, had approved of the screening procedures used in Arm-
strong. Id. Finally, the separation of the defendant from its law firm would not pose as
serious a hardship as was threatened in Armstrong. Id.
This example represents the more common situation in which the former government
attorney has the ability to use confidential information received while employed by the gov-
ernment. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979). See, e.g., United
States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843 (1979); United
States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1979). Cf. Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 567 F.2d 225, 233 (2d Cir. 1977)(nongovernment attorney disqualification under Canons
4 and 9); Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973)(nongovernment
attorney disqualification under Canons 4 and 9).
, Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 444.
" See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RISPONsmirrY, CANON 4. Where former government
attorneys defends private litigants against the former employer there is a significant appear-
ance of impropriety because it may appear that the attorneys may have "conduct[ed] their
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Similarly, firm disqualification would be warranted when a
former attorney for the Justice Department who had substantial
responsibility over the investigation and prosecution of an anti-
trust action was subsequently hired as an associate with a firm
which had begun a similar action against the same defendants. As-
suming the Justice Department has no interest in the private ac-
tion and does not assist in its prosecution in any way, the firm will
be unable to avoid disqualification even if the former government
attorney is conscientiously and thoroughly screened from partici-
pation. Unlike the SEC in Armstrong,100 the Justice Department
did not turn over its files to the firm nor did it approve the screen-
ing techniques used.101 Therefore, the former government attorney
might use information in the private action which was gained in
confidence as a public employee and was unavailable to the other
side.102
In another situation, an antitrust action is brought against
odd-lot firms by buyers and sellers of the firm's securities. An at-
torney who is "of-counsel" to plaintiff's co-counsel is currently em-
ployed by the SEC, and assigned to an investigation of the
defendant firms. The attorney has a substantial responsibility over
the SEC investigation, and is clearly disqualified under DR 9-
101(B). A motion is made to disqualify plaintiff's counsel for viola-
tion of Canons 5 and 9.1o The firm probably will be disqualified
even if it argues that it has effectively screened the attorney by use
of a "Chinese Wall."I 04 In such a situation, the appearance of im-
offices with an eye toward future employment" or to "unduly favor those litigants .... .
United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 340 (2d Cir. 1979).
100 In Armstrong, the SEC had given the receiver all of its files and records prior to the
retention of the Gordon firm. 625 F.2d at 445. Altman, therefore, possessed no information
which was not already known to the receiver and the Gordon firm.
101 In Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980), the court noted that one of the
factors militating against the efficacy of screening was the prior employer's objection to the
use of screening procedures. Id. at 1058 n.7. Where the former employer, however, not only
approves of screening but also cooperates in the subsequent litigation, there is little threat
of the former government attorney unfairly using privileged information unavailable to the
other side. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 445.
102 625 F.2d at 444 (citing Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 n.1 (2d Cir.
1979) (Mansfield, J., concurring)). See General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d
639 (2d Cir. 1974); Telos, Inc. v. Hawaiian Tel. Co., 397 F.Supp. 1314 (D. Hawaii 1975).
103 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSaiLrry, CANONS 5 & 9; notes 2 & 3 supra.
104 A "Chinese Wall" is essentially the same as screening; both techniques are
designed to create an impermeable barrier to intrafirm exchange of confidential
information . . . [by] isolat[ing] the disqualification to the lawyer . . . infected
with the privileged information that is the source of the ethical problem and
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propriety is significant, and the violation oT Canon five's proscrip-
tion against simultaneous adverse representations is apparent. 105
Additionally, permitting the co-counsel to continue representation,
in light of the Armstrong directives, would either taint or pose a
threat of taint to the underlying trial.
From the above examples it is apparent that the efficacy of
screening was limited by the Armstrong court to only a few well-
delineated situations. Thus, the movant's burden of proving that
screening will be ineffective is not as onerous as it may appear.
10 6
Conclusion
The Armstrong court carefully examined the practical effects
of permitting immediate appeals of disqualification motions and
thereby ... allow[ing] other attorneys in the firm to carry on the questioned rep-
resentation free of any taint of misuse of confidences.
Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677,
678 (1980).
1O It appears that screening will not be sufficient to avoid a disqualification order in a
concurrent representation case. Thus°far, the Seventh and the Second Circuits have rejected
the efficacy of screening in such a case. See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); Fund of Funds, Ltd.
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977).
Seeking to establish an unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade by various corporations
involved in the uranium industry, the plaintiff in Westinghouse retained the law firm of
Kirkland and Ellis to represent it. Concurrent with its representation of Westinghouse, the
law firm was retained by the American Petroleum Industry (API) of which three of the
defendants were members. As counsel for API the law firm released a report which took a
positive stand on the issue of competition in the uranium industry in seeming opposition to
its stand for Westinghouse. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d at
1312. The court disqualified the firm, citing violations of Canons 4, 5, and 9. In so doing, the
court rejected the Chinese Wall theory as modifying the presumption of imputed
knowledge. Id. at 1321. The court further noted that the large size of the firm and its greater
exposure to conflict of interest problems did not justify application of a more lenient impu-
tation of knowledge standard than would be applied to smaller firms and sole practitioners.
Id.
In Fund of Funds, a law firm undertook representation of a mutual fund even though it
knew the latter was considering a suit against Arthur Andersen & Company (Andersen), an
accounting firm which the law firm also represented. 567 F.2d at 227. Although the law firm
assisted the mutual fund in obtaining new counsel in the suit against Andersen, the Second
Circuit nevertheless held that the new counsel was disqualified because it assisted the first
firm in violating Canon 5, was in a position to misuse confidential information about Ander-
sen in violation of Canon 5, and had violated the Canon 9 prohibition against an appearance
of impropriety. Id. at 233. Moreover, the court found that a Chinese Wall erected in the first
firm was ineffective to dispel the appearance of impropriety.
1o1 Cf. Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980) (screening ineffective where
attorney of small firm representing defendant had previously worked for nongovernmental
agency currently representing plaintiff). See note 96 supra.
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concluded that the successful use of such motions as a delay tactic,
as well as the availability of alternative modes of review and re-
dress upon appeal from final judgment, militate against permitting
immediate appeals as of right.10 7 Such a result is consistent with
the express federal policy against broadening the scope of Cohen'08
and preserves the policy and purpose of the final judgment rule. 09
The Armstrong court has demonstrated a renewed faith in the
trustworthiness and integrity of former government attorneys and
their firms. 110 In holding that a mere appearance of impropriety is
insufficient to disqualify a firm,"' the court has eliminated the
presumption of shared knowledge that arises when a former gov-
ernment attorney is involved." 2
It is suggested that the Armstrong court's approval of screen-
ing, although limited, is a trend-setting decision in the area of pro-
fessional responsibility and ethical conduct. It is suggested, more-
over, that to ensure the propriety of screening procedures bar
associations should establish committees to regulate screening pro-
cedures and issue uniform guidelines for firms to follow in setting
up screens."' Such committees would serve to allay the fear that
107 See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
108 See Baker v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.2d 1074, 1077 (2d Cir. 1974); Weight
Watchers v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972); West v. Zurhorst,
425 F.2d 919, 921 (2d Cir. 1970); Comment, Appealability of Denials of Motions to Disqual-
ify Counsel, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 212, 226.
109 See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
110 The en banc majority in Armstrong noted that twenty-six prominent former govern-
ment attorneys as amici curiae had contended that they had all been affected by the as-
sumption of the original Second Circuit panel in Armstrong that government attorneys can-
not be trusted to adhere to screening techniques or to faithfully carry out their duties while
with the government. 625 F.2d at 443. Indeed, the original panel had warned that the gov-
ernment attorney "must understand, and it must appear to the public, that there will be no
possibility of financial reward if he succumbs to the temptation to shape the government
action in the hope of enhancing private employment." Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28,
34 (2d Cir. 1979).
I Prior to its decision in Armstrong, the Second Circuit advocated that ethical con-
flicts which involve only an appearance of impropriety should be dealt with by the discipli-
nary powers of the various bar associations. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241,
1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Lefrak v. Arabian American Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1975);
Ceramco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1975).
112 See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
112 Cf. Note, Ethical Problems for the Law Firm of a Former Government Attorney:
Firm or Individual Disqualification? 1977 DuKE L.J. 512, 528-30 (calling for judicial ap-
proval of screening techniques). It has also been suggested that the disqualified attorney
and his firm be required to certify under oath that they will faithfully adhere to the screen-
ing techniques. Comment, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65
GEo. L.J. 1025, 1047-48 (1977). Another procedure would be the promulgation of criminal
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the public's distrust of, and disillusionment with, the judicial pro-
cess will be magnified by permitting a firm to continue representa-
tion when a mere appearance of impropriety exists." 4
Ziporah Janowski
statutes to sanction violation of affidavits promising to refrain from discussion of the case.
Id. at 1048.
14 See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
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